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Abstract
In this paper, I would provide a logically consistent taxonomy
of alternative health care financing avenues. I then explore
the implications of these alternatives, finally establishing the
conclusion that a combination of tax-financing and capped
voluntary payments, supplemented by the setting of “moral
hazard neutral” fees, would serve the purposes of expenditure
containment, universal access to health care, and optimal
resource allocation.

1. Introduction
Health care reform is a subject of universal interest and constant
debate. Despite all the confusion, however, a number of things are
clear. It is clear that universal access to health care is very much
cherished in every country. It is clear that we need a mechanism to
avoid waste and to encourage people to practise preventive medicine.
It is clear that expenditures on health care should be made as long as
benefits exceed costs. The question is: which way of health care
financing will best achieve these goals.
There are no perfect solutions, but some options are obviously
better than others, and our task is to look for the best among these.
I shall present an option that can be dubbed the Swedish model,1 and
I shall argue that this option is among the best available. I shall
1

I do not endorse all aspects of the Swedish model. Fees in Sweden tend
to be too low and taxes tend to be too high. But the Swedish capping of
annual health care expenditures is an eminently sensible idea consistent with
the concept of excessive burden insurance.
1

discuss the details and feasibility of my proposal from both an
implementation and a political point of view.
Section 2 will lay out the various financing options that are
available. Section 3 will describe the concept of excessive burden
insurance, why I strongly recommend this concept, and how it is
implemented and received in Sweden. Section 4 will discuss the
details of implementation, if it is introduced in Hong Kong. Finally
Section 5 will provide a brief summary of the conclusions.
2. A Taxonomy of Financing Options
Health care spending is either forced or voluntary. Forced
spending on health care can be in the form of directly forced health
spending programmes like mandatory medical savings plans and
mandatory medical insurance plans, or indirectly forced spending on
health funded out of taxes. Voluntary spending on health care can
be in the form of voluntarily subscribed health insurance, or
voluntarily paid health care fees and charges.
If information is adequate, all forms of voluntary spending can
be considered efficient. Those who spend would consider the
benefits and the costs involved and will not spend unless the benefits
outweigh the costs. However, information in the health care market
is far from adequate. Patients often have to rely on health care
service givers to tell them what services they will need. They may
also purchase services without knowing that the services will
actually bring them benefits, or benefits in sufficient amount. This
matter of “information asymmetry” between caregivers and patients
has to be considered in any proposal for reform.
In general, forced medical savings plans are inefficient unless
the bureaucrats who decide over the medical savings package know
better than the individuals who are directly affected as to how much
benefits will be derived from such savings. In general, a medical
savings plan will not open up new opportunities for the individual;
rather, it will reduce his opportunities. So it must be inefficient.
On the other hand, a forced medical insurance plan does open up
new opportunities. It has potential for improved efficiency. A
forced medical insurance plan can pool risks. It will allow small
contributions to generate big benefits, in the form of protection for
2

anyone insured when misfortune strikes. The “forced” element will
help combat the problem known as “adverse selection” and “known
cost drivers.” Adverse selection refers to the phenomenon of
insurance plans attracting bad risks that seek protection while low
risk individuals will avoid costly insurance plans. Known cost
drivers refers to patients who are known to be costly to service, so
voluntary insurers will avoid them. Clearly, there is a case for
mandatory health insurance.
However, mandatory health insurance potentially has an
important drawback that must be addressed. This is the problem of
moral hazard. There is supply-side moral hazard and there is
demand-side moral hazard. The former refers to caregivers giving
unnecessary services for financial gains. The latter refers to
patients consuming services excessively in disregard of the costs
involved. Health care reform must address this subject of moral
hazard.
Health care spending out of taxes are not voluntarily made by
the taxpayers or by patients. Bureaucrats make the decision over
how much to spend on health care and on what. While there is an
element of compulsion budget allocations on health care out of the
general revenue can be efficient if a careful benefit-cost analysis is
performed in evaluating whether or not a particular item is worth
purchasing. The bureaucrats who make the decisions serve as
agents for the taxpayers and for the community to further their
interests. While bureaucrats may well pursue their own interests
rather than the interests of the community there is no necessary
contradiction between the interests of the community and the
interests of the bureaucrats, especially when they are responsible to
politicians who are in turn responsible to their constituents. In fact,
members of the community cannot individually conduct a
community-wide benefit-cost study for health care and health related
expenditures. They need to engage someone with the authority and
training to do the study properly. To the extent that benefits
outweigh costs, there is even a case for increasing taxes in order to
finance the worthwhile expenditures.
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3. Excessive Burden Insurance
It is commonly believed that the government should target its
subsidies at the poor. If administrative costs allow, then, there
should be means testing for every government subsidy programme
ranging from legal aid to health care. This logic appears to be
sound, but is really flawed for the simple reason that government
subsidies are always financed by those who pay taxes. While no
one would question the arrangement that taxpayers subsidize the low
income and the welfare recipients when they seek health care, is it
therefore wrong for taxpayers to subsidize those who are sick among
themselves? In particular, in the case of health care and by the
same logic in the case of legal aid, expenditures that may be
warranted to save life and to restore justice may stretch the limits of
even the well to do. It is certainly unjust and unreasonable for
taxpayers to pay for all the costs of health care for others and yet left
unprotected at the very times when they need help.
For this reason the case for what I call excessive burden
insurance is truly strong. Excessive burden insurance is the
concept of requiring the individuals to be responsible for their own
expenditures for as long as they can afford it, and providing them to
be assisted when they find the burden excessive. In practice, in the
case of health care I recommend setting a yearly spending limit for
each household. This spending limit would be based on the
number of members in the household and in principle should be
based on the household income. Because assessing household
income is not easy and is administratively costly, I would
recommend setting a uniform yearly spending limit per person for
the majority of Hong Kong’s households, plus one concessionary
spending limit for the poor. Based on a survey that I have
conducted, I discover that the greater majority of respondents would
be prepared to spend up to 6 per cent of their income on health care.
On that basis, I propose that the spending limit be set at 6 per cent of
the median household income, which in the third quarter of 2000
stood at HK$17600. Given that there are 3.3 persons per household,
this works out to be $3840 per person. For the poor who are judged
to be worthy of further assistance, I would propose that the spending
limit be set at half of this, i.e., at $1920. This means that the
4

household will be responsible for all qualified health care
expenditures up to their respective spending limits but need not
worry about any more spending. If they are healthy, of course they
do not have to spend this much. If they have health problems, they
will not need to worry about not being able to come up with the
money.
The advantages of this system are obvious. The most important
advantage of course is that household now no longer need to worry
about unpredicted health care expenditures that could stretch their
limits. The other advantage, also an important one, is that we can
now be in the position to price health care services closer to their
direct costs, so that individuals will have stronger incentives to use
health care services carefully, and they will also have stronger
incentives for adopting a healthy lifestyle and to avoid falling sick.
The incentives under this system and the risks for households
under this system will be quite unlike what prevail today. Today,
charges are unreasonably and extremely low. Patients pay only $68
for a day of in-patient care regardless of the treatment they receive,
unless they need what are stipulated as “privately purchase medical
items.” Clearly, such a low rate of charge will not even cover the
cost of food provided, not to speak of the professional care that must
be provided and the cost of maintaining the hospital bed. For
outpatient care the charges are at $38 or $42 depending on whether it
is general or specialist clinic that is attended. Accident and
emergency care, and ambulance services are free. Such low
charges must cause excessive use and must draw patients from the
private sector unnecessarily and unjustifiably.
It must be noted that because of the huge demand for HA
facilities under such pricing, queues at HA hospitals are long.
Patients in urgent need of care may have to turn to private hospitals,
which can however be prohibitively expensive. Private hospitals
are expensive not because the direct costs are necessarily higher than
public hospitals, but because there are huge overhead costs that must
be paid for. Charging patients only at direct costs will lead to huge
financial losses that may not be sustainable. So patients are
exposed to the risk of not being able to get the service they need in a
timely fashion, and of having to pay possibly highly burdensome
costs should they opt for private care. Even in public hospitals, in
5

case the privately purchased medical items are required, patients
may also have difficulty2. Presently the list of privately purchased
medical items are as follows:
(1) Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty(PTCA)
and other consumables for interventional Cardiology
(2) Cardiac Pacemakers
(3) Introcular Lens
(4) Myoelectric Prosthesis
(5) Custom-made Prosthesis
(6) Implants for purely cometic surgery
(7) Appliances for prosthetic and orthotic services,
physiotherapy and occupational therapy services
(8) Growth hormone and interferon
(9) Home use equipment, appliances, and consumables.
We are also aware of the fact that because medicines are
provided free, a limited budget has prevented the HA from allowing
the prescription of certain expensive drugs. So patients are
deprived of the opportunity for better care. What is most
unacceptable is that patients are not given the option of paying more
to get better and faster service.
One objection I heard frequently about excessive burden
insurance is that it is complicated. Actually it is not complicated at
all. In fact Sweden has practised excessive burden insurance for
years. Statistics show that Sweden has kept its health care
expenditures at moderate levels.
The following is a brief
description about excessive burden insurance in Sweden:
Patients' charges for using the health service increased
significantly during the 1990s. In 1990 the charge for visiting a
doctor stood at SEK 60 either for a visit in the primary health
care system or at a hospital. Today a primary health care visit
costs an average of SEK 100 and a hospital visit costs twice that.
2

It is true that patients in principle can ask for assistance if they can provide
evidence of financial difficulty. But financial difficulty may not be so easy to
prove sometimes.
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However, no-one pays more than SEK 900 a year. Exemption
from charges for children and young people was introduced in
1998 and remains in place in most counties.
Charges for prescription medicine have seen the most significant
increase. In 1990 patients had to pay the full cost of the medicine
up to a maximum of SEK 75 at each purchase. Today we have a
system which means that the patient pays the full cost up to SEK
900, and thereafter there is a gradual fall in the proportion of
the cost to be paid. However, no-one pays more than SEK 1,800
during a twelve-month period.
(excerpt from: http://www.sos.se/SOS/PUBL/REFERENG/0003008E.htm)

Sweden is much more advanced in aging compared to Hong
Kong and most other countries, with 17 per cent of its population
above the age of 65, as compared to only 10.5 per cent(1997 figures).
Yet its health service expenditures as percentage of the GDP was
only 8.6 per cent in 1997, a notch lower than that in 1998. The
comparable figures for Hong Kong is 4.8 per cent, which is much
higher than that in 1998(3.3 per cent). There is much satisfaction
about the Swedish health care system. To wit, a recent article thus
described of the achievement of the Swedish health care system:
For the most part, Sweden’s health care system is an effective
and trusted provider of medical services for the northern
European nation of 8.7 million. Swedish life expectancy is long,
at 77.6 years, and infant mortality rates are relatively low at 4.5
per 1,000.
Sweden spends less than its Scandinavian
neighbours on health care —7.6 per cent of its gross domestic
product3, compared with 8.2 % in Norway and 8.8% in
Finland —yet overall quality of health and health care is
comparable throughout the region.
From: “Swedish Health Care Robust, Despite Regional Disparities,”
Ocular Surgery News, International edition, May 1997
3

The figure of 7.6 per cent corresponds to the figure for government health
care
spending
as
a
per
cent
of
GNP
cited
in
http://www.slackinc.com/eye/osni/199705/sweden.htm.
7

4. Details of the Proposal
There are several elements in the proposal:
l pricing of covered health services at standard fees to reflect
direct costs;
l setting of an annual spending limit for each person in the
household;
l concessionary pricing and lower spending limits for the poor;
l option for private hospitals and medical practitioners to
commit to charging standard fees for covered health services
in return for a lumpsum grant;
l appropriation from the general tax revenue to fund lumpsum
grants, fixed health care expenditures, and the cost of
excessive burden insurance;
l a smart card to hold medical records and accumulated health
care expenditures.
I propose that we sharply increase the fees now being charged
for services rendered in Hospital Authority hospitals and
government-funded clinics, to reflect the direct costs of providing
these services. This will serve four purposes: to increase the
awareness of costs among the public, to better utilize the facilities
now available in the private health care sector, to raise revenue, and
to improve the quality of services.
There is plenty of evidence that raising fees charged will reduce
demand. Provided that the raised charges are within the limits of
affordability, we need not worry that this will be at the expense of
citizens’ health. The higher charges are necessary because we need
to promote the cause of sickness and accident prevention and to
prevent abusive use of the services. In principle, the charges
though higher than those of today should be low enough to be
neutral on supply-side behaviour. We do not want suppliers of
health care services to oversupply for financial gain or to
undersupply to avoid financial loss.
The annual spending limit is the cornerstone of excessive
burden insurance. If the annual spending limit is set at a reasonable
level, citizens will no longer need to worry about health care
8

expenses ever stretching their limits. This annual spending limit
brings peace of mind and will make higher charges much more
palatable for the public.
The concessionary charges and spending limits are politically
necessary and socially desirable. We need to charge the poor for
their use of health care services, because they also need to be aware
of the costs involved. If necessary I would propose that we provide
a health care supplement to the current CSSA stipends. If
recipients keep their health well they would have an additional
income for other uses. This way the incentive to maintain health
and to use health services judiciously will be preserved.
I propose that we give private hospitals and medical
practitioners the option to join the “basic health care system” by
pledging to charge standard, approved fees only for the services
covered in the basic health care system. In return for charging
lower fees, they would receive an annual lumpsum grant that reflects
the range of services that they provide and their capacity. Private
hospitals will make their own arrangements with doctors in regard to
compensation for professional services rendered under their auspices.
The Hospital Authority will not need to step in the contractual
arrangements between private hospitals and private doctors.
Once these arrangements are in place, we can expect patients to
move out of the public health care system into the private health care
system. The public sector then will no longer need to expand as
fast as otherwise without the system. We will save a lot of public
money that will have to be needed to build more hospitals and to
equip them. Quality of services at the HA hospitals will improve as
queues get shorter and patient loads decline.
There is no need to charge citizens for excessive burden
insurance premium. Under my proposal, the insurance scheme is
funded from taxes, which actually means that those who with higher
ability to pay will pay more in support of the system. This being
the case, there is no longer any need to deprive the richer people of
the right to receive subsidies. An advantage of this arrangement is
that the system does not require any payroll tax or direct health care
related contributions from our workforce.
Excessive burden
insurance is also fair in that, by making the sick people pay more
when they can afford it, it protects the healthy people from having to
9

shoulder an unreasonable burden. While the sick will have to pay
up to the annual spending limits per year the healthy will not have to
pay anything other than regular taxes —in “premiums” or in fees.
The system will generate much needed revenue to improve the
quality of health care. Suppose we charge on average five times
higher than current charges (I recommend perhaps $400 per night for
in-patient care instead of $68, and $100 per visit for out-patient care
instead of $38 to $44.) Considering the cap, I estimate that we may
end up collecting about 3 billion dollars in revenue or perhaps 10 per
cent of the total recurrent HA expenditures in 2000/2001. The net
increase in revenues would amount to about $2 billion, which
represents some 8 per cent of total revenues from the salaries tax.
While this may not seem to be much, we must consider the fact
that the demand for services will be reduced, and there are also
savings in terms of less need to build hospitals. Private doctors’
incomes will rise, and so income taxes from private doctors should
also rise.
The last element in my proposal is a smart card to carry
patients’ medical records and records of fees paid during the year.
The smart card is linked to a central data bank which is updated each
time a patient pays the eligible fees and receives health care services.
As soon as the annual spending limit has been reached, the patient
will no longer need to pay any more fees, unless he gets extra
services that are not covered in the basic health care plan. The
smart card, to be carried around by citizens like an ID card, will
provide important medical information in case of emergency and
will enable the individual’s medical accounts to be updated
automatically. The technology is readily available and will not be
very costly. Since no collection of premiums or contributions will
be needed, there will also be a saving in administration cost.
In practice, the annual spending limit and the range of health
services covered under the basic health care plan must be worked out
with community participation. Although I had proposed 6 per cent
of median earnings, it is up to the community to decide if this is
adequate. Clearly, if the services covered is wider, a higher annual
spending limit will be necessary, meaning that each individual will
have to be responsible for a large amount of health care
expenditures.
10

5. Conclusions
The proposed excessive burden insurance scheme is, on
reflection, not a big departure from the health care system we know
today. Like the present system, the excessive burden insurance
scheme is tax-funded. There will be no insurance premiums or
contributions to collect. Like the present system, costs, particularly
overhead costs, will be subsidized heavily. Charges are set at
“reasonable levels.” The difference is that the “reasonable levels”
under EBI are much higher and in principle reflect the direct costs of
providing the services. Both the present system and the proposed
EBI place a lot of emphasis on accessibility. Whereas the present
system tries to achieve accessibility by making prices very low, the
proposed EBI system tries to achieve accessibility by capping health
care expenditures borne by the individual. HA hospitals are to be
funded in more or less the same manner under the present system as
under EBI. There will be no mechanism for “money follows the
patient.”
However, because charges at public hospitals and
subsidized private hospitals are unified, patients will be much more
ready to use private hospitals.
While Sweden imposes a uniform annual ceiling on the health
care expenditures that must be paid by the patients themselves, the
charges on health services vary from county to county. These
variations notwithstanding, a basic principle is that quality health
care services must be available and easily accessible to all residents
in Sweden (Health and Medical Services Act of 1982). This
principle can be said to be universal, and is certainly equally
applicable in Hong Kong. But Swedish taxes tend to be too high
and medical charges tend to be too low. While fees for clinic visits
range from SEK 100 to SEK140 in the state sector, the fee charged
for a stay in hospital is a mere SEK 80 per day(one Swedish kroner
is worth less than HK$1.) If we want to ensure a high quality of
services without excessively burdening the taxpayer, fees charged
under excessive burden health insurance should reflect direct costs
better. Although estimating direct costs accurately will prove
difficult, precise estimates of direct costs is not really necessary. It
does not require careful study to learn that current charges in Hong
Kong are much too low and will engender wasteful behaviour.
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As I argue in my book Principles of Public Policy Practice, I
support the “professional model” for basic health care(See Chapter
5). The professional model relies on salaried, professional doctors
who are largely free of money consideration to provide basic care.
The current Hospital Authority follows the professional model and is
largely independent of the bureaucracy. Market participation by
doctors and insurers will provide useful supplementary services and
will enhance choice. Citizens can opt to buy insurance to cover
what they have to pay before the yearly spending limit has been
reached as well as to have coverage for services not covered under
the basic health care plan. The market model will likely leave
many people underinsured or uninsured. The bureaucratic model
will render it impossible for professional health care givers to
operate independently and effectively. In conclusion, I strongly
recommend a system of tax-financed excessive burden health
insurance for financing and a system of professional-run health care
system for delivery of health services.
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